Southern Business Review
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 6

April 1981

Supply-Side Economics and the Kemp-Roth Bill
Steven R. Thrift
Georgia Southern College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Thrift, Steven R. (1981) "Supply-Side Economics and the Kemp-Roth Bill," Southern Business Review: Vol.
7: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr/vol7/iss1/6

This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Southern Business Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.

SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS AND THE
KEMP-ROTH BILL
Steven R. Thrift
In the Soviet Union. farmers on collective farms must deliver to the
state 90 percent of what they produce - in effect, a 90 percent tax. However, they are also permitted to have small private plots on which they
can grow food for themselves or to sell. And while these plots constitute
three percent of the total cultivated land of the U.S.S.R., they produce
24 percent of that nation's agricultural output.' How can one explain this
phenomenon? The land is no better, for the state would not give away its
most fertile land for private profic. If Jack Kemp were asked to explain
the situation, he would no doubt reply that it's a matter of incentives.
Along with Senator William Roth of Delaware, Kemp is sponsoring
supply-side economic legislation known as the Kemp-Roth package. ' The
two bill package provides three things: across-the-board tax cuts in all
personal income tax rates of 10 percent a year for three years; tax indexing or "inflation-proofing" to prevent future tax increases: and legal
limits requiring federal spending to grow slower than the economy for
the next four years.'
Within the Keynesian framework, the effectiveness of fiscal policy
~,ems from its impact on aggregate demand. Aggregate demand is the
propelling force of the Keynesian model. Until the capacity constraint of
the economy is reached, ~upply is passive; the pressure of aggregate demand will always elicit a response. The Keynesian model focuses primarily on events in the short run, with relati ve prices playing a secondary role
in the analysis. The view st resses the linkage between the fullemployment budget deficit (or surplus) and aggregate demand.•
In contrast. supply-side fiscalists emphasize the interrelationship between the government's tax-expenditure policy and aggregate supply. It
is from this emphasis thac the term "supply-side fiscal policy" is derived .
Supply-side fiscalists believe that the Keynesian fiscal policy is deficient
because it fails to consider the importance of the effect that relative price
changes have on productive incentives.'
Relating supply-side theory to our present situation is a relatively
simple task. First of all, supply-side fiscalists argue that tax rates are too
high. With each additional dollar that is earned by an individual. he
keeps less of it as he moves up the marginal tax schedule. The extremely
high rate of inflation is rapidly causing each "John Doe" to keep less of
what he earns. The reward for work (or production) becomes less, while
ac the same time the cost of leisure becomes less. Many people ask the
question, "Why try to earn more when I'll get less for it?"
Supply-side fiscalists argue that a reduction in tax rates is the answer to
the problem. A reduction in tax rates would enable everyone to keep a
larger share of each dollar earned, thereby increasing the incentive to
work and produce, while raising the opportunity cost involved in leisure
and non-market activities. The shift away from non-production caused
by the reduction of tax rates will enlarge aggregate supply.• Greater aggregate supply would mean present dollars chasing more goods, thereby
easing inflation. A greater supply of goods should mean a further reduc-
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tion in price levels. Lower taxes, more work, and less in flation would
mean a rapid increase in real income. With more income, saving levels
(which are presently at an all time low) would go up. A release of interest
ceilings would allow for greater returns on savings. When savings are increased, investment could rise, helping further expand the economy.
Supply-siders also suggest that i r corporate tax rates were cut
businesses would engage in more productive ventures rather than non'.
productive tax-deductible ones (such as resort-vacation " meetings" for
executives).
A large problem with supply-side economics and the Kemp-Roth bill is
the concern within the Federal government about potential loss in
revenues that would result from the tax cuts. Of course, this seems to be
a logical concern. It would seem that a cut in tax rates would cause a toss
of tax revenues and, it would follow, a larger deficit in the federal
budget. Then, in financing the deficit, greater in nation would be seen as
an inevitable result.
But the supply-siders don't see it that way. They believe that irwecut
taxes the effect would not be a loss or government revenues. They argue
that a faster growing economy would ultimately increase government
revenues, even at lower tax rates, because there would be a larger volume
of private and corporate income to tax.
The heart of the argument can be shown by the " Laffer curve," a
graphic illustration that Professor Arthur Laffer of the University of
Southern California has applied to taxation. An illustration or the Laffer
curve is shown in Figure I. '

Figure I
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As the graph shows, there is a point _o f maxi~um governmef~
revenues at point A . Above that point, an increase m tax rates wo\
resu lt in decrease in government revenues. This is what Laffer ~alls t e
· gro w mcreas"prohibitive range. " In this range, rewards for pro d ucmg
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ingly smaller as tax rates rise, causing production to fall off enough to
actually decrease government revenues. If tax rates were to go up to 100
percent, there would theoretically be zero revenues because of the total
lack of reward for production. In turn, a tax rate of zero would likewise
produce no revenues, and moving toward point A from zero increases
revenues.
The heart of the problem lies in a single question: Where is point A?
Supply-siders argue that we are above point A, perhaps at point B. They
believe that a decrease in tax rates would sti mulate production enough to
increase tax revenues. Professor Laffer himself believes that the U. S. today is in the incentive-impairing, counterproductive "prohibitive
range," and that a cut in taxes should bring increased economic activity
and higher, not lower, tax revenues.'
Many government officials fear that Laffer's opinion may be wrong.
Some believe that we are below point A, maybe point C, and that a cut in
tax rates would produce lower tax revenues, making the government's
deficit worse. Many of them simply don't know, and feel that an incorrect decision would be tragic.
The major evidence that Congressman Kemp cites in his crusade is the
result of the Kennedy tax cuts of 1964-65. which reduced income tax
rates nearly 20 percent and cut the corporate tax rate from 52 to 48 percent. Although the Treasury had forecast a revenue loss of $89 billion for
the years 1963-68, tax revenues actually increased by $54 billion, because
of the great acceleration in economic activity. Laffer believes, as Kemp
does, that the Kennedy experience would be repeated .
But the Kennedy cuts aren't Kemp's only evidences. He also cites examples in France, Italy, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan , as well as
other examples in the United States. In each case he points to the fact
that tax cuts resulted in a boom in each economy. In the French example,
taxes were cut 30-40 percent while tax revenues jumped from 5.4 billion
prewar francs to 7 billion during 1926-27. •
Further, Irving Kristo! points to the fact that of the almost dozen tax
cuts since 1946, in each case government tax receipts have increased
within a year or two, and in no case have these tax cuts prevented continuing growth in federal tax revenues. 10
While the Keynesians consider the Kennedy cuts to have been a huge
success, in their view the crucial element was the expansion of demand.
They argue that the effect of tax cuts on incentives has not been proved,
at least in the tax environment in the U. S. Walter Heller, major architect
of the 1964 tax cut, states that:
Nothing in the history of tax cuts, econometrics studies, studies of
taxpayer responses, or field surveys of incentives suggests that the
effects of a big tax cut on the supply of output even begin to match
its effect on demand for output. A $114 billion tax cut (as proposed by the Kemp-Roth bill) in three years would simply overwhelm our existing productive capacity with a tida'. wave of increased demand and sweep away all hopes of curbing deficits and
containing inflation. 1 1
Another contrast between Keynesians and supply-side fiscalists is that
the supply siders claim that their theory explains both the economic ex-
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pan~ion follo"".ing the 1964 tax cut and the stagflation of the 19?0'
Their explanation of stagflation is as follows:
s.
The massive increase in the number of persons pushed into high
marginal tax brackets as a result of inflation discouraged productiv
effort. _Similarly, the expansion in transfer payments has encour~
age~ le1s~re and unreported activities, since in order to qualify for
various 1~come transfer programs individuals must keep their
r~corded incomes low . . . _This combination - high taxes, which
discourage work (and capital formation), and expanded transfer
payments, which encourage leisure - leads inevitably to economic
stagnation."
According to supply-side fiscalists, an increase in marginal tax rates
will retard real output for four major reasons:
I. The Substitution of Leisure for Productive Market Effort. People
may decide that productive effort which yields so little personal return
is simply not worth it. They will directly substitute leisure for taxable
work effort.
2. The Elimination of Many Productive Market Exchanges. Instead of
doing his own job that pays $15 an hour and be taxed at 50 percent, a
worker would be better off to take an hour off from work to paint
his house rather than pay a painter $10 per hour. In this case a productive market exchange would be eliminated (between the worker
and the painter) that would have occurred had the tax rate been only
20 percent. Real income declines as high marginal tax rates retard
productive exchanges between parties.
3. The Substitution of Less Desired Tax-Deductible Goods for More
Desired Nondeductible Goods. Luxury automobiles for business use,
a company airplane, company membership in a country club, a business-related vacation in Hawaii, a plush business office, and numerous other business-related goods can be enjoyed at a fraction of their
cost to society since they are business expenses. The relative price of
deductible and nondeductible goods is ~eriously distorted by high
marginal tax rates. Wastt' and economic inefficiency result.
4. Valuable Resources Are Channeled into the Tax Shelter Industry.
High marginal tax rates increase the incentive of individuals to take
steps to reduce their tax liabilities. This may be done by occupation
(for example, use of a tax lawyer), opening businesses with large tax
advantages, or investing in projects that reduce tax liability. All of
this activitv will consume real resources, which would otherwise be
applied to 'more valuable, productive activities were it not for high
marginal tax rates."
.
The Kemp-Roth bill is legislation that attempts to put into action
supply-side economic theory. First, it would reduce personal income
taxes for all Americans about 10 percent a year for 3 years. Al the end of
the 3 year period, all tax brackets would be adjusted yearly accordin~ to
the Consumer Price Index, to prevent taxpayers from being pushed mto
higher tax brackets without real increases in income. This part of the
package is known as the "Tax Rate Reduction Act.",.. . .
,,
The second part of the package is the "Spending L1m1tat1on Act.
This act would limit federal spending to a declining share of gross national product. It would limit federal spending to 21 percent of GNP m
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fiscal year I 980 (had it gone into effect), 20 percent in 1981, 19 percent in
1982, and I 8 percent in I 983. ''
Besides a ffecting the labor su pply, legislation of this type has an effect
on the supply of capital. Recent evidence suggests that the lower the tax
rate on saving-investment activity, the larger the amount of after-tax
future income that is sacrificed by enjoying added current consumption.
Lower taxes, therefore, tend to increase savings and investments. The
end result of this process is an increase in the supply of capital."
Besides looking at all of this in terms of dollars, there are also
philosophical questions involved. Some people feel that the government
simply has no right to tax us as much as they do. They feel, as did
Thomas Jefferson, that the best government is the least government.
They feel that the government governs too much, and in short. it costs
money to govern . Many feel that the role of government should be cut as
well as taxes. On the other hand, others feel that the government is
within its rights and feel that the loss of power resulting from a tax cut
would be dangerous. These are some questions that we as a society must
answer.
The question of " massive" tax cuts creates considerable problems in
economic forecasting. No econometric model presently available can
easily measure supply-side effects. Further. the human element, which is
always a complicating factor in economics, is involved in the prognoses.
As for actual forecasts, the results vary widely. The Treasury Department under the Carter administration predicted that were the KempRoth enacted, government revenues would decrease. On the other hand,
projections by President Reagan' s forces project an increase in government tax receipts given their plan. Reagan 's overall plan calls for the
following:
I . Reductions in personal tax rates and business taxes.
2. Spending cuts and other mearnres to reduce the budget deficit.
3. Reductions in the burden and the intrusion of Federal regulations.
4. A new commitment to a stable monetary policy."
This plan includes the Kemp-Roth, ten percent a year for three years,
tax cut proposal. The Reagan plan projects that with ta>. cuts beginning
in 1981, government revenues will increase from the 1980 level of $520
billion to $600.2 billion in 1980, $650 billion in 1982, up to $851 billion in
1985." Further. the plan projects little or no upward impact on inflation.
since they feel that tax cut income will be channeled into savings. Certainly this asrnmption is open to argument. They also feel that the budget
cuts will lessen the inflationary propensity.
Whether or not the tax cuts will be enacted and enacted in their purest
form is to be seen. At this writing, the legislation is in Congressional
committee. If the cuts are enacted, the rest of the Presi dent's plan will
have an impact on their effect. However, becau'>e of the sa'v ings assumption, the psychology of the American people at the time of the implementation of the cuts may well be the most important factor in deciding their
economic success or failure, especially in terms of their inflationary
impact.
No o ne can predict wht:ther or not policy will become an integral part
of our long-term economic framework. Even if it falls by the wayside,
perhaps we should at least take part of the philosophy to heart. The typi-
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fying statement of the philosophy may be the following quote of J k
Kemp:
Gen~r~lly speaki~g. if you tax something you get less of it. If you
subs1d1ze something, you get more of it. In America we tax work
growt~,. investment, employment, savings, and prod'uctivity, whit~
subs1dmng non-work, consumption, welfare and debt. 19
Even if we don't opt for su pply-side economics, that's something 10
think about.
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